This paper analyses the impact of substitution between …xed and mobile telephony on call prices. We develop a model where consumers di¤er in the bene…ts of mobility and …rms price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls. We …nd that call prices are distorted downwards due to substitution possibilities and customer heterogeneity, and that this distortion increases with the …xed-mobile termination mark-up.
mobile communication markets.
From the theoretical point of view, there exists a relevant -though not large -literature on the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony, with a focus on the role of …xed-to-mobile access (or termination) charges. For example, Wright (2002) , Valletti and Houpis (2005) , and Baake and Mitusch (2009) consider …xed-to-mobile calls and focus on the impact of mobile termination charges on retail charges and the number of users.
These papers however do not consider the role of …xed-mobile substitution (both at access and service level), and more importantly, they do not take into account consumer heterogeneity with respect to the bene…ts for mobility. Moreover, they focus on the e¤ect of access charges on market equilibria, while our main focus is on retail price distortion. Armstrong and Wright (2009) also analyze the role of call substitution but their focus is on the role of voluntary vs. regulated setting of termination rates. These authors show that direct substitution between …xed-and mobile-originated calls weakens the competitive bottleneck of call termination. Hence, the welfare gains from regulating mobile termination rates are smaller, while private incentives do not imply excessively high levels. Our paper departs from this study by analyzing the more realistic situation where substitution a¤ects not only the types of calls made but also consumers' subscription decisions, though we do not endogenize the role of the termination charge. Our model closely considers the suggestion by Armstrong and Wright (2009) who state that "an alternative kind of substitution between …xed and mobile networks may take place at the subscription level rather than the per-call level, so that some people might give up their …xed line altogether and become mobile-only users." (p. 296).
Our model considers both …xed-mobile substitution and elastic subscription demands on both types of (…xed and mobile) networks. In particular, drawing on our previous paper (Hoernig et al., 2015) , we develop a game-theoretic model with three independent but interconnected operators, one …xed and two mobile networks. On the demand side, all subscribers spend the same fraction of their time outside home, but each of them has a di¤erent personal bene…t from having a mobile phone. Depending on their bene…t for mobile communications, subscribers choose whether to single-home or to multi-home, that is, whether to subscribe to a …xed or a mobile network, or to both. This implies that …xed and mobile telephony are simultaneously substitutes and complements: They are complements because even owners of a …xed line bene…t from having a mobile sub-scription, by being able to make calls when they are not at home. They are substitutes because when both networks are available only the cheaper type of call will be used. This paper di¤ers from our companion paper in two ways. First, the goal of Hoernig et al. (2015) was to analyze the impact of varying levels of termination rates on consumers' subscription decisions. The key question was whether the di¤erent regulatory treatment of termination on …xed and mobile networks a¤ects the development of …xed and mobile subscription decisions. Our previous …ndings show that termination rates have an e¤ect on subscription substitution and …xed disconnection: A higher mobile (…xed) termination rate increases the number of mobile (…xed) users and lowers that of …xed (mobile) users, via the waterbed and cost e¤ects, respectively. Higher termination rates also tend to increase the number of customers who do not adhere to any network, identifying a tradeo¤ between the uptake of individual networks and total uptake.
The present paper is centered instead on the setting of retail prices, and not on wholesale prices, and points out the kind of retail level distortions mobile operators could adopt to gain market share in the presence of …xed-mobile substitution. Second, and more importantly, in this paper we use a more realistic retail pricing structure close to the one adopted in reality by mobile operators. In particular, we assume that …rms adopt multi-part tari¤s with network-based price discrimination (i.e., call charges depend on the destination network). For calls only between mobile networks, this pricing scheme has been already adopted in several other papers, such as La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998), Gans and King (2001) , Cambini and Valletti (2003) , Hoernig (2007 and , but none of these studies takes into account the bene…t from mobility and the presence of …xed-mobile substitution as we do in this paper.
The focus on …xed-mobile substitution is not only theoretically interesting in itself since it contributes to the previous literature, but it is also founded on the recent empirical literature. Indeed, recent studies on EU data provide stronger evidence on …xed-mobile call substitution across European countries. Briglauer et al. (2011) …nd that, at least for Austria, …xed and mobile calls are strong substitutes while access substitution is rather weak. Grzybowski (2014) analyzes substitution between access to …xed-line and mobile telephony in the European Union and shows that decreasing prices for mobile services increases the share of mobile-only households and decreases the share of …xed-only and …xed-mobile households, which suggests substitution between …xed-line and mobile connections. Finally, Grzybowski and Verboven (2014) show that …xed and mobile connections are generally perceived in the EU as substitutes, especially in regions with a higher GDP per capita, but also that there is a lot of heterogeneity across countries due to the interplay of speci…c social and economic features (i.e., households with di¤erent age, education, professional activity, etc.). However, all these papers do not empirically consider the presence of network based price discrimination, since they generally consider an average mobile charge without looking at single price components (i.e. on-net and o¤-net prices) separately. Hence, this paper also provides new testable predictions for future empirical work on the impact of …xed-mobile substitution on mobile commercial tari¤s.
Our model predicts that mobile call prices for on-net, o¤-net and mobile-to-…xed calls are all distorted downwards due to substitution possibilities and this distortion is greater the higher is the …xed-mobile termination mark-up. This implies that mobile networks adapt their pricing structure to compete stronger for mobile-only customers than for …xed-mobile customers. Indeed, our results show that …xed-mobile substitution generates a waterbed e¤ect between …xed-to-mobile and mobile-only pro…ts: the higher pro…ts from …xed-to-mobile termination are used to cut mobile-only retail prices and enhance competition between di¤erent technologies. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we …rst lay out the model, and then discuss the equilibrium tari¤s in Section 3. Finally, we conclude.
Model Setup
Consumers and …rms. We assume that there are two mobile networks and one independent …xed network.
3 In order to concentrate on the distortions in mobile call prices, we assume that call prices on the …xed network are equal to the corresponding marginal cost, including termination rates, which tends to result from multi-part tari¤s.
A mass 1 of consumers decides whether to subscribe to a mobile network and/or to the …xed network. According to network choice, we call them mobile-only (M), …xed-only (F), and …xed-mobile (FM) subscribers. Consumers spend a fraction of their time 2 (0; 1) outside home. When on the move, which happens with probability , a consumer can only use a mobile phone to make or receive calls. When at home the consumer may have access to a …xed and/or a mobile phone; if he has both, he chooses whichever is cheaper to make calls.
Calling patterns are balanced, and consumers are on the move or at home independently of each other. 4 They are heterogenous in their …xed bene…t from mobility and, independently, in their preferences for the two mobile networks, as we will specify below.
We further assume that when consumers choose which network(s) to join, they know their bene…ts from mobility, but not yet their network preference. For example, consumers may …rst decide whether or not to have a mobile phone and which one (e.g., an iPhone or an Android phone), and then only decide which mobile operator to subscribe to. termination c o and c t , and on-net costs c = c o +c t . In order to determine the determinants of equilibrium prices, we allow for mobile termination rates that depend on the origin of calls: For mobile-to-mobile calls, it is a = c t + m, and for …xed-to-mobile calls it is a f m = c t + n, where m; n 0 are the corresponding termination margins. We will see below that retail pricing distortions exist if and only if n > 0. Similarly, the …xed network has marginal costs c xo < c o and c xt < c t , on-net cost c x = c xo + c xt , and a termination
We make the assumption that the …xed-to-mobile termination margin is small, n < c o c xo . 7 As a result, the marginal costs of calls are ordered as follows:
Tari¤s and surplus. Mobile network i charges a tari¤ (F i ; p i ;p i ; p ix ), where F i is a monthly …xed fee, and p i ,p i and p ix are the mobile-to-mobile on-net, o¤-net and mobileto-…xed per-minute call prices, respectively. As mentioned above, the …xed network sets call prices equal to their marginal cost, on-net p x = c xo + c xt and …xed-to-mobile
We also postulate (and later con…rm), that the following ordering of call prices holds:
which implies that mobile calls are only used when no …xed phone is available. Note also that due to (1), this ordering of prices holds when equilibrium prices are close enough to their respective marginal cost.
The consumption utility from a call of length q is u(q), where u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0.
For price p, the caller's indirect utility is v (p) = max q u(q) pq, and the call duration is q = v 0 (p), leading to the obvious short-hands
from the surplus obtained from making calls, subscribers obtain an access bene…t that depends on the network(s) they subscribe to. If a consumer subscribes only to a mobile network or to the …xed network, his subscription bene…t is A m or A x , respectively. If he subscribes to both types of networks, he obtains an access bene…t of A mx .
A mobile-only user makes all calls with his mobile phone and obtains the surplus the corresponding consumer expectation, and
the number of receivers on …xed phones.
Similarly, a …xed-only user makes all calls from his …xed line, and receives the surplus
where m = m + mx . For further reference below, also de…ne = m + 2 mx and
Note that …xed-only users can only make calls when they are at home, which occurs with probability 1 .
When an FM-subscriber of network i is on the move, the order of prices (2) implies that it is cheaper for him to make mobile-to-…xed calls than mobile-to-mobile calls when receivers are at home (p ix < p i ;p i ). Thus, mobile-to-mobile calls are only made when receivers are themselves on the move. 8 Similarly, when he is at home it is cheaper to use the …xed phone than the mobile phone for any type of calls. We can then express the expected surplus of FM-subscribers as
There is substitution to cheaper calls involving the …xed network both when callers are on the road and when they are at home.
Market shares. As already mentioned, consumers di¤er in their preferences for mobile networks. They learn these preferences after deciding to take up a mobile subscription, but before choosing a speci…c mobile network. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that the former decision has already been taken, 9 thus we consider the subscriber Pro…ts. The pro…ts of mobile network i are given by
They consist of pro…ts from subscriptions, from calls to other mobile users, from calls to the …xed network, and termination pro…ts from calls arriving from the other mobile and the …xed network.
Equilibrium Tari¤s
We now determine the symmetric equilibrium tari¤ (F i ; p i ;p i ; p ix ) of mobile operators as a Nash equilibrium in their pricing game. The proof of the following Proposition is in the Appendix.
10
Proposition 1 In the symmetric (rational expectations) Nash equilibrium of the mobile market, we have the following outcomes:
1. Mobile call prices are set below their respective marginal costs if and only if the …xed-to-mobile termination margin is positive (i.e. n > 0),
10 We assume the existence of a shared equilibrium. This is ensured as long as is low enough and a is close to the marginal transportation cost. The proof of existence would follow the same lines of La¤ont et al. (1998) , as extended to asymmetric settings by de Bijl and Peitz (2002) .
2. …xed fees are equal to
and equilibrium pro…ts are Interestingly, this distortion applies to all calls in the same direction. Indeed, in the previous literature on network competition with network based price discrimination (e.g. La¤ont et al. 1998 , Jeon et al. 2004 , either all call prices are identical to marginal cost, or on-net call prices are set below marginal cost and o¤-net call price above.
Second, the retail price distortion is proportional to the mark up on …xed-to-mobile termination charges, n. Indeed, the above conditions show that the distortion disappears if and only if n = 0, i.e. no pro…ts can be made from terminating …xed-mobile calls.
The main intuition of this result is therefore as follows: FM-customers can be reached on both mobile and …xed phones, while M-customers can only be reached on their mobile phones. This implies that M-customers bring more valuable call termination business. This in turn leads mobile operators to decrease their own retail prices in order to compete more …ercely for mobile-only customers. Indeed, also the …xed fee F i decreases as n gets larger. A waterbed e¤ect is therefore in place: the pro…ts from …xed-to-mobile termination are moved to decrease retail prices for calls which are proportionally more used by mobile-only customers.
It is interesting to note that the distortions in all call prices are qualitatively similar. Letting = pq 0 =q denote the respective price elasticity of demand, we have:
This underlines that the same strategic interaction determines the respective (negative) mark-ups.
The distortion due to …xed-mobile substitution depends also on . It is interesting to observe that this factor tends to decrease in , that is, the probability that consumers are on the move. This implies that the more mobile-only consumers are on the move, the lower is the distortion in call prices, everything else equal. Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a more precise statement without introducing speci…c assumptions about the demand function. However, this result holds at least if mobile subscriptions are su¢ ciently heterogenous (i.e. low ), which magni…es the e¤ect of on and in turn on .
Welfare Considerations
Finally, it is important to consider the potential welfare e¤ects of mobile price distortions emerging due to …xed-to-mobile substitution.
Given that subscriber numbers of di¤erent technologies are …xed, the equilibrium allocation depends only on call quantities. Call prices are below marginal costs including termination rates, but in the absence of call externalities (see Jeon et al., 2004) welfare would be maximized with call prices at network marginal cost. From Proposition 1
we observe that on-net prices are always too low, i.e. they are always below network marginal cost. This implies that too many on-net calls are made. In this setting, a high termination charge for the …xed-to-mobile calls bene…ts mobile users while reducing the consumer surplus of …xed telephony users (although some consumers use the two services).
To restore e¢ ciency, the socially optimal choice would be to reduce the margin for …xed-to-mobile calls to zero, that is set …xed-to-mobile termination equal to marginal costs, i.e. n = 0. With n = 0 on-net price becomes socially optimal while the prices of o¤-net calls and mobile-to-…xed calls would remain above marginal costs as long as m > 0 and a x is above cost. To further increase social welfare and fully internalize network externalities, then, the regulator might also set m = 0 and a x at cost. The latter decision, though, is totally unrelated to the distortion due to …xed-mobile substitution we …nd in this paper, since the distortion is only driven by the …xed-to-mobile termination mark up n.
In a nutshell, in order to increase welfare and limit the price distortion that emerges due to …xed-mobile substitution, a possible regulatory intervention would be to move towards cost-oriented …xed-to-mobile termination. This reduction would mostly bene…t …xed users that will pay less for any …xed-to-mobile call; on the contrary, mobile users will face a reduction of their surplus since they will no longer bene…t from the "distorted" mobile tari¤s . Further bene…ts may even come from eliminating any mark-ups from mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-…xed termination charges. In this latter case, all consumers would bene…t from a complete convergence between …xed and mobile calls and prices will be no longer distorted.
From a technological perspective, the distinction between …xed and mobile termination could also be much reduced in the context of forthcoming NGN/IP-based networks.
In future integrated IP-based mobile and …xed networks, marginal costs for terminating a call will converge on both networks and approach zero. Moreover, voice will represent only a small fraction of tra¢ c; therefore, total costs will have little to do with minutes of voice use, but will be much more driven by capacity requirements. The discrepancy between …xed and mobile termination rates appears therefore unjusti…ed in a convergent market, even though the ratio between mobile (i.e. …xed-to-mobile n, and mobile-tomobile m) and …xed terminations rates has decreased recently. A report by BEREC (2013) shows that the average termination rate in the EU27 in January 2013 was equal to 2.58ecents/minute, while the average …xed termination rate ranged between 0.50 and 0.80ecents/minute according to the level (layer) of interconnection, still a ratio of 3.1.
Hence, termination on mobile networks, and in particular …xed-to-mobile termination charges, is still at least three times more expensive than on …xed networks. Interestingly, this discrepancy is absent in the US where the ratio between …xed and mobile termination rates is 1:1. Indeed, in the US call termination has a strong tendency toward symmetry in the rates charged for reciprocal compensation, and the latter are capped at a rate that re ‡ects the marginal cost of the …xed termination. In most of the negotiations mobile-to-mobile termination charges are set to zero (i.e. the so called "bill-and-keep"; Marcus, 2004; Vogelsang, 2015) . This regulatory intervention might be useful not only to decrease retail prices overall, but also to avoid call price distortions due to …xed-mobile substitution as we highlight in this paper.
In the last two decades mobile telephony has had a tremendous impact on the …xed telephony market. Due to the bene…t from mobility, subscribers in many countries now use their mobiles more than their …xed lines, and quite often disconnect the latter. In this paper, we have presented a model that captures the substitution between …xed and mobile telephony at the subscription and call level, by taking into account consumer mobility (i.e., the fact that consumers are sometimes at home, and sometimes on the road). The main insight of the paper is that in a context of subscription substitution mobile networks distort downwards call prices for on-net, o¤net and mobile-to-…xed calls.
This distortion is greater the higher is the …xed-to-mobile termination mark-up. The intuition of this result is that mobile operators want to cut the retail prices of mobile-only users in order to attract a larger fraction of them, because this type of consumers generates more termination revenues than the consumers that use both mobile and …xed telephony.
Thus, mobile networks adjust their retail prices and the …xed component of the tari¤ to compete stronger for mobile-only customers than for …xed-mobile customers. This is an instance of the waterbed e¤ect, since the pro…ts from …xed-to-mobile termination are moved to decrease retail prices for calls, which are proportionally more used by mobileonly customers.
This paper provides interesting …ndings to evaluate the regulatory design of mobile-tomobile and …xed-to-mobile termination rates over the last 20 years. Clearly, in the near future, the technological change towards all-IP networks will modify the scenario of the current analysis. It should lead to termination charges close to or at zero for both mobile and …xed networks. This model does not encompass such a setting but presents a kind of backward-looking analysis that is useful to highlight the impact that termination charges had, and still continue to have, on the phenomenon of …xed-to-mobile substitution. In the future, it seems likely that competition dynamics will be shaped by bundle o¤ers with a reduced importance of paid-for voice calls (and thus weaker network e¤ects at the operator level); substitution between …xed and mobile subscriptions will then mainly be driven by broadband quality. www.novasbe.pt
